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CRIPPLING UNITED STATES AIRLINES: ARCHAIC
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION




The Federal Aviation Act's1 (FAA) requirement that a United
States citizen own or control seventy-five percent of the voting interest
of a domestic airline2 provides an excellent example of a regulatory
policy which stifles the economic development of an industry currently
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
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States Department of Transportation for his support and the entire Office of Hearings
for providing the author with the opportunity to gain valuable insight as a law clerk.
All views expressed herein are the author's and are in no way attributable to any De-
partment of Transportation personnel.
1. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301 et. seq. (1988)).
2. Id. at § 1301 The FAA, for purposes of ownership and control of a domestic
airline, defines a citizen of the United States as:
(a) [A]n individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its possessions,
or (b) a partnership of which each member is such an individual, or (c) a corpo-
ration or association created or organized under the laws of the United States or
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, of which the President
and two-thirds or more of the board of directors and other managing officers
thereof are such individuals and in which at least 75 percent of the voting inter-
est is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States or of
one of its possessions.
49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) (1988).
This analysis focuses on regulatory agency interpretations of § 1301 which require a
United States air-carrier to demonstrate not only that it meets the voting stock require-
ment but also that it actually is owned and controlled by citizens of the United States
within the meaning of section 1301(16) of the Act. Pan Aviation, Inc., D.O.T. Order
No. 86-8-65 at 10 (1986); Denham Aircraft Services Corp. II Fitness Investigation,
C.A.B. Order No. 83-8-54 at n.1 (1983).
In addition to the citizenship requirement, an applicant air-carrier must establish
that: (1) it will have the necessary management skills and technical ability, before
beginning service, to safely conduct the proposed operations; (2) if not internally fi-
nanced, it has a plan for financing that, if carried out, will generate sufficient resources
to commence the proposed operation without undue risk to consumers; and (3) it will
comply with the Act and regulations imposed by federal and state agencies. In re Dis-
covery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41 at 4-5 (1989); Pan Aviation, Inc.
Fitness Investigation, D.O.T. Order No. 86-8-65 at 9-10 (1986); Sun Pacific Airlines
Fitness Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 81-6-126 at 4-6 (1981); New York Air Fitness
Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 80-12-57 at 4 (1980).
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facing severe financial difficulties3 while ostensibly fostering growth
and fulfilling national objectives.4 During the 1990 fiscal year, many
domestic airlines operated at a loss.5 Stringent restrictions on foreign
capital investment,6 coupled with a weakened economy and volatile oil
prices,8 crippled an already faltering airline industry.9 The economic
ramifications of an impaired airline industry affect the entire United
3. See U.S. Airlines Expect 4th-Quarter Losses Exceeding $1 Billion, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 19, 1990, at A7A (noting that airline industry analysts predict record losses ex-
ceeding one billion dollars for United States airlines in the fourth quarter of 1990);
Northwest Air Plans to Cut Some Flights as of Nov. 1, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1990, at
B8 (speculating that to remain functional, struggling airlines must impose employee
cutbacks and reduce flight schedules); Nomani, Northwest Air Union Rejects Wage-
Cut Plan, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1990, at B10 (suggesting the entire airline industry
must accept fare increases, asset sales, and mergers to remain solvent); Nomani &
O'Brian, AMR Seeks Pan Am's London Routes, Moves to Top United Airlines Agree-
ment, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1990, at A3 (detailing the collapse of Pan Am, as well as
the airline's effort to sell its most lucrative London routes to United Airlines, in ex-
change for cash and a marketing agreement in order to avoid total collapse); Valente,
Midway's Deal Signals Airline's Fare Shakeout, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1990, at A3
(concluding that Midway Airlines' attempted sale of its unprofitable hub operation at
Philadelphia to USAir for cash mirrors the decline of Braniff, which filed for bank-
ruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in 1989, People's Express, and New York Air);
O'Brian, Continental Hopes to Sell Planes, Not International Routes, to Raise Cash,
Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1990, at A4 (noting that Continental Airlines' board of directors
considered a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing and offered to sell a number of its assets in
an attempt to raise cash).
4. See infra notes 51-97 and accompanying text (noting the legislative history of
United States aviation law clearly demonstrates that Congress enacted the citizenship
requirement both to ensure United States national security and to protect the United
States aviation industry from foreign competition).
5. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 Bankr. 164, 168-69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting Eastern Airlines' operating losses from March 9, 1989 through April
1990 exceeded $1.2 billion); Medina & Nomani, Delta Air Posts Loss of $51.6 Mil-
lion; UAL Net Income Slips to $106.1 Million, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1990, at AS
(indicating that in the first quarter of 1990, Delta Airlines suffered almost a fifty-two
million dollar loss while in the third quarter USAir's net income loss increased from
approximately seventy-eight million dollars in 1989 to one-hundred twenty million dol-
lars in 1990); Hamilton, Pan Am to Sell Routes, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1990, at G1
(detailing Pan Am's sale of a major portion of its transatlantic service in order to raise
enough cash to survive).
6. See infra notes 103-39 and accompanying text (detailing the restrictive interpre-
tation of the citizenship requirement).
7. See Berry, U.S. Economy Moves Deeper Into Recession, Figures Show, Wash.
Post, Feb. 16, 1991, at G11 (stating that both Allen Sinai, chief economist of the Bos-
ton Co., and Michael Darby, undersecretary of commerce, predict the United States
economy will continue to move deeper into a recession).
8. See Tanner, War Beginning to Sop Up Glut of World's Oil, Wall St. J., Feb. 14,
1991, at A3 (attributing increased oil prices to the Persian Gulf War).
9. See Kilman, Nomani & Taylor, It May Be Irrational, But Terrorism Anxiety
Spurs Plunge in Travel, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1991, at Al (observing that travel book-
ings dropped by up to twenty-five percent since the beginning of the Persian Gulf cri-
sis); Carroll & Kim, Pan Am Sells Key Routes to United, USA Today, Oct. 24, 1990,
at B1 (noting that Pan Am lost over one billion dollars during the past five years).
[VOL. 7:173
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
States economy.' 0 If the industry continues its downward spiral, it
could ultimately push the entire United States economy into an even
deeper economic recession."' The Department of Transportation's
(DOT) stringent interpretation of FAA § 1301(16) mandating seventy-
five percent United States citizen ownership and control of all United
States air-carriers represents a major cause of the airline industry's
current problems. By forcing airlines to adhere to this interpretation,
the DOT thwarts the free market system by reducing the available cap-
ital pool from which airlines can draw funds for development and sta-
bility in difficult times. Ultimately, this requirement leaves failing air-
lines with two options: either distribute assets according to a judge's
ruling 2 or raise capital according to agency directives.' 3
This comment addresses the inherent problems of interpreting the
statutory requirement mandating United States citizen ownership and
control of seventy-five percent of the voting interest in a United States
air-carrier as pertaining to all forms of equity ownership as well as
indirect personal control. Part I describes the economic and political
realities currently influencing contemporary citizenship requirement in-
terpretations. Part II addresses the citizenship requirement's statutory
history and congressional modifications. Part III examines the evolution
of administrative interpretations of the citizenship requirement, and
10. See Kilman, Nomani & Taylor, supra note 9, at A13 (noting that travelers
spent approximately three hundred and fifty billion dollars in the United States in
1990). This figure represents almost seven percent of the United States gross national
product. Id. See also Crenshaw and Hamilton, USAir Cost-Cutting Action May Prove
to Be Expensive, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1991, at DI (discussing USAir's decrease in its
insurance coverage from thirty-three million dollars to sixteen million dollars); 300
Northwest Flight Attendants Face Layoffs; Others Take Leaves, Wash. Post, Feb. 17,
1991, at A13 (noting that Northwest Airlines laid off three hundred employees and
asked another six hundred to take a voluntary leave of absence).
11. See Auerbach, Aircraft Makers Hit by Airline Recession, Wash. Post, Feb. 13,
1991, at C10 (noting the problems in the air-carrier industry negatively affect aircraft
manufacturers who accounted for almost eighty percent of the overall United States
economic growth in 1990); see also Kilman, Nomani & Taylor, supra note 9, at Al
(noting United States travel agencies recently laid off hundreds of employees);
Nomani, Climbing Fares Are Scaring Off Air Travellers, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1990, at
B1 (stating that airline fares increased at a rate of eleven and one-half percent between
January and August of 1990, which represents an increase of almost two times the rise
in overall consumer prices during the same period).
12. See McCartney, Northwest Gets Rights at National, Wash. Post, Feb. 16,
1991, at G1l (noting a United States bankruptcy judge's ruling prohibiting Eastern
Airlines from selling specific assets to the highest bidder, United Airlines).
13. See id. (noting the Justice Department's objection, based on competition
grounds, to Eastern Airlines' sale of designated assets to United Airlines); McGinley &
Nomani, U.S. Says Refusal of British Airways Bid to Cut Fares Applies to Domestic
Carriers, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1991, at A4 (discussing the Department of Transporta-
tion's refusal to allow Pan Am, TWA, Northwest Airlines, Continental, USAir, and
American Airlines to cut fares by as much as fifty percent).
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demonstrates how these interpretations hinder the development of the
aviation industry by making it more difficult for airlines to acquire op-
erating capital. Finally, part IV recommends alternative approaches to
the DOT's stringent interpretation of § 1301(16) and the inherent
problems of restricting foreign capital investment in the airline
industry.
I. CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THEORIES
Before analyzing the economic and political consequences of citizen-
ship requirements, one must first recognize the economic theories gov-
erning international trade. Current international trade policy divides
along two distinct lines of reasoning.14 The first adheres to the classical
concept of free trade. 15 This concept concludes that liberalization of
trade barriers by minimizing government interference in trade crossing
international borders enhances a country's economic potential,'0 re-
gardless of whether all countries participate.17 The law of comparative
advantage, 18 which asserts that free trade enhances the potential eco-
nomic growth of all nations by promoting a competitive market atmo-
sphere for worldwide trade and investments, constitutes an essential
part of the free trade theory.' 9 The second line of reasoning historically
centers around domestic efforts to sustain national growth20 and fulfill
14. See Caplan, Out of Bondage: Loosening the Grip of U.S. Export Controls,
Export Today, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 34, 35 (explaining that advocates of a liberal free
trade policy encourage open investment markets to allow industrial growth and contin-
ued United States leadership, while advocates of government regulation of foreign in-
vestment demand economic protection for United States industries in an effort to ad-
vance domestic policy goals and to ensure that citizens of the United States reap the
benefits of foreign trade).
15. See generally J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1990) (analyzing the classical free trade
model and its application to present day international trade).
16. Id. at 1-2.
17. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 18 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC RELATIONS] (asserting that trade barriers negatively affect the economy of the
country invoking those barriers because they force domestic consumers to pay more for
each unit of the restricted product and consequently consumers have less disposable
income to spend on other products).
18. See C.P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-20 (5th ed. 1973)
(explaining the assumptions behind the theory of comparative advantage).
19. See id. (explaining that a comparative advantage results when a country ex-
ports the commodity in which it has a production advantage and imports those in
which it has a disadvantage).
20. See PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 17, at




national objectives21 through government intervention in international
trade.22 As the complexity of multinational economic interdependence
23
escalated, 24 nations initially employed trade barriers as a tool to pro-
mote national objectives in foreign policy 25 and to protect specific do-
mestic industries from foreign competition. 26 Economists label this the
neomercantilist economic theory.
After World War II, economists and policy-makers realized the im-
portance of implementing a global economic policy to maximize the
Jackson and Davey first argue that government intervention gives domestic producers
a larger market share, and thus creates more domestic jobs, protects workers in a high-
wage industry from "pauper labor" in developing countries, and equalizes costs in the
importing and exporting nations. Id. at 18-19. Jackson and Davey also assert that some
national interests, such as the need to protect an industry necessary for national de-
fense or some other national goal and the need to enable a new industry having a
potential comparative advantage to develop to the size necessary to achieve that com-
parative advantage, are so imperative as to require trade restrictions. Id.
21. See id. at 28 (noting that although most economists concur with the theory that
unrestricted international trade maximizes global production, policy concerns of indi-
vidual nations often mandate certain protectionist polices motivated by political goals,
such as protecting particular groups from foreign competition and the need to develop
specific industries, rather than maximizing output); see also Fisher, The Multination-
als and the Crisis In United States Trade and Investment Policy, 53 B.U.L. REV. 308,
309-16 (1973) (discussing the first instance of United States infant industry protection
and the evolution of trade barriers).
22. For other sources examining the history of United States international trade
policy, see generally S. METZGER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND
(1964); J. CONDLITTLE, THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS (1950); I. TARBELL, THE TARIFF
IN OUR TImEs (1911); E. STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1903).
23. See Cooper, Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies, 24
WORLD POL. No. 2, 159-81 (Jan. 1972) (describing the magnitude of international
economic interdependence which characterizes the contemporary global policy of
states).
24. See D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONo.IC RELATIONS] (providing an excel-
lent in-depth analysis of the proliferation of economic interdependency among devel-
oped as well as undeveloped nations).
25. See id. at 11-18 (analyzing inherent problems as well as the political and eco-
nomic ramifications when nations use trade policy as leverage for international political
relations); see also Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 2, 83
Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988)) (finding that
the complexity of, and interrelation between, trade balances, capital accounts, service
accounts, foreign exchange rates, and international monetary reserves allowed nations
to impose trade barriers as policy vehicles).
26. See Malmgren, Coming Trade Wars?, FOREIGN POL'Y, No. 1 (Winter 1970-
71) at 120 (explaining the neomercantilist trade orientation as one in which states
stimulate home production, reduce imports, and promote exports to maintain a bal-
ance-of-trade surplus and encourage domestic production and employment).
27. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 9 (noting that the ne-
omercantilist economic theory elevates national priorities to the same level as the effi-
cient use of resources and economic growth).
1991]
178 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 7:173
economic potential of all countries.2 Most importantly, nations in-
volved in World War II aspired to prevent the reoccurrence of the eco-
nomic policies that helped foster World War 11.29 Major western states
ultimately forged an economic alliance"0 based on the premise of pro-
moting international trade as a growth stimulant.3 This alliance re-
sulted in unprecedented global economic interdependence.3 2
Beginning in 1971, the United States faced an extraordinary eco-
nomic crisis 3 as a result of a critically high balance of payments defi-
cit 34 coupled with an aggressive expansion policy by foreign investors33
during which the influx of foreign capital investment into the United
States rose almost nine hundred percent." United States public senti-
ment eventually shifted towards a policy which advocated government
intervention in international trade.37 This shift in public sentiment per-
28. See id., at 11-12 (describing international economic policy evolution in the pe-
riod following World War II).
29. See id. (citing C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 8-9 (1949)) (con-
demning the global economic policies of export subsidies, high tariffs, and discrimina-
tory trade agreements for causing the deterioration of world trade and a global eco-
nomic depression).
30. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 12-14 (describing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the principle organization uti-
lized by market economy countries to establish, through multilateral negotiations and
international standards, principles, and procedures which promote international trade
through trade barrier reductions). For discussions of the GATT negotiation and dispute
settlement procedures, see generally R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT ch. 8 (1969).
31. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 12 (describing the goals
of GATT as maximizing global trade and economic growth by reducing trade barriers
in a nondiscriminatory fashion).
32. J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, REGULAT-
ING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 25 (1986) [hereinafter REGULATING INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS] (noting that in 1983 United States profits from foreign operations accounted
for approximately one-fifth of all corporate profits while international investment ac-
counted for approximately one-sixth of all manufacturing investment) (data derived
from United States Department of Commerce, 61 Surv. Current Bus. 33 (June, 1986)).
33. See United States Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports OBR
71-009 and United States Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, news re-
lease FT 900-71-6, July 28, 1971 (finding United States balance of exports and imports
changed from a positive average annual balance of $5.4 billion during the 1960's to a
negative balance of $3.2 billion, annual rate, for the second quarter of 1970).
34. See United States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics,
news release OBE 71-43, July 6, 1971 (concluding that during the first quarter of 1971
the United States deficit reached an annual rate of $22 billion).
35. See United States Department of Commerce, 61 Surv. Current Bus. 33 (June
1986) (revealing that between 1973 and 1985, foreign direct investment in the United
States increased from $20.5 billion to $183 billion).
36. Id.
37. See R. VERNON, EXPLORING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 8-9 (1985) [hereinafter
EXPLORING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY] (noting public outrage in the United States over
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meated congressional deliberations and executive branch determina-
tions.38 Consequently, government leaders and administrators deviated
from the classical free trade model39 of open markets and imposed re-
strictive measures on foreign imports and capital to appease their con-
stituents." At the same time, the percentage of the United States gross
national product (GNP) involved in international trade rose almost
eighteen percent.,' Experts speculate this percentage will more than
double in the next ten years."2
Statutory restrictions on foreign capital investment represent an im-
portant hidden barrier to the free flow of international trade. These
restrictions generally take the form of citizenship requirements43 in
which the United States imposes capital restrictions on non-United
States citizens investing in a United States industry. In reality, this
policy mirrors neomercantilist economic theory" which places national
economic priorities on the same level as efficient resource allocation
and growth. 5 Thus, before attempting to modify the citizenship re-
quirements, one must determine Congress"46 economic motive47 in lim-
the perception of inequitable treatment by other nations imposing non-tariff barriers on
United States products).
38. Id.
39. See GLOBAL ECONOMlIc RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 6 (explaining the reason-
ing put forth by proponents of the classical liberal economic model for asserting that
efficient allocation of resources among all the world's economies produces the maxi-
mum economic growth for each individual state).
40. EXPLORING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 37, at 8-9.
41. See REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 32, at 23 (noting the
magnitude of United States involvement in international trade rose from two percent of
the United States GNP in 1950 to approximately twenty percent in 1986).
42. See id. (concluding that forty percent of the United States GNP could be tied
to international trade by the end of the twentieth century).
43. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) (1988)) (defining "Citizen of the United States");
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 310 (b)
(1988)) (restricting common carrier licenses to United States citizens); Shipping Act of
1916, Pub. L. No. 64-2460, § 2, 39 Stat. 728 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 802 (1988))
(mandating seventy-five percent United States citizen control for licensed maritime
vessels employed in coastal trade); Federal Banking Act, (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 72
(1988)) (requiring United States citizen officers for United States banks).
44. See GLOBAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 9 (noting that neomer-
cantilists view economic relations as a means to distribute wealth and power rather
than as a way to maximize global welfare).
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-3. The legislative branch's authority over foreign
commerce and trade derives from article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which specifi-
cally empowers Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises" and
to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." Id.
47. See Fisher, The Multinationals and the Crisis in United States Trade and In-
vestment Policy, 53 B.U.L. REv. 308, 308-11 (1973) (arguing that congressional obses-
sion with United States trade policy wandered over the years between the need to pro-
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iting the percentage of voting stock a foreign entity can hold in a
United States air-carrier.48
II. ORIGINAL CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. NATIONAL SECURITY
Fundamental principles of statutory construction require interpreting
statutory language according to its use at the time Congress passed the
legislation. "9 This principle is difficult to apply to the FAA's citizenship
requirement because statutory history reflects a congressional economic
policy which evolved over time in conjunction with economic situations
and political realities which no longer exist. 50
During the early stages of commercial aviation development, Con-
gress initiated the citizenship requirement to assure aircraft availability
for national defense purposes. 51 At the time, congressional leaders and
duce revenue, protection against "unfair" foreign competition, concern over national
independence, and protection of United States infant industries and established United
States industries).
48. For purposes of this analysis, the citizenship requirement of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) (1988), serves as the illustrative example.
Note, however, the similarities in other federal statutes that limit foreign investment
by mandating citizenship requirements. See, e.g., Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §
802 (1988) (mandating seventy-five percent control by United States citizens for li-
censed maritime vessels employed in coastal trade and 51 percent United States citizen
control for those engaged in international trade); Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 310(b) (1988) (prohibiting foreign individuals and foreign corporations from
holding a United States common carrier license). The Communications Act defines a
foreign corporation as:
[A]ny corporation of which any officer or director is an alien or of which more
than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens or their
representatives or by a foreign government or representative thereof or by any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country; [or] any corporation
directly or indirectly controlled by any other corporation of which any officer or
more than one-fourth [25%] of the capital stock is owned [by aliens].
Id. at § 310(b)(3)-(4).
The act most similar in rationale to the FAA, however, is the Merchant Marine Act
in which Congress' stated intent was to protect the United States in wartime, to ensure
that control of shipping vessels remained in American hands, and to prevent foreign
interests from acquiring control of American shipping by any device. Merchant Marine
Act, Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 38, 41 Stat. 988, 1008 (1920).
49. See Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 150 (1984)
(analyzing the "ordinary meaning" of a term as used by Congress); see also Livermore
v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 1401-03 (9th Cir. 1984) (analyzing a term according to
common usage during the period in which the legislation passed).
50. See infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text (describing congressional ration-
ale for initially invoking citizenship requirements and the subsequent debates over the
percentage of foreign ownership allowed for a United States air-carrier).
51. See Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services: Hearing Before
the House Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Ser-
vices, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 527 (1925) (statement of Major General M. Patrick, Chief
[VOL. 7:173
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military planners advocated government intervention in commercial air
carrier development for the dual purpose of training a reserve corp of
pilots5 2 and maintaining an auxiliary air force 3 for United States mili-
tary service during national emergencies." Congressional leaders and
military advisors ultimately concluded that national security necessi-
tated a citizenship requirement for ownership of United States air-car-
riers.5 They premised this conclusion on the assumption that, without
a citizenship requirement, non-United States citizens might control
some components of the theoretical auxiliary military air-fleet.5 ' Propo-
nents of this policy maintained that citizens of the United States should
hold at least seventy-five percent of the interest in a United States air
carrier 57 to counter possible foreign control problems.5 '
When finally enacted, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (1926 Act)
required a corporation to maintain fifty-one percent United States citi-
zen ownership of voting stock,60 as opposed to non-voting equity or debt
interest, sixty-six and two-thirds percent United States citizen member-
ship on the corporation's board of directors, 61 and a president 2 who
of the Army Air Service) [hereinafter Air Services Hearing] (encouraging interdepen-
dence between the military and the commercial aviation industry).
52. See id. (noting the United States military Air Service's inability to maintain an
adequate air fleet in preparation for a national emergency and the need to depend on
domestic air-carriers to augment United States military requirements during crisis situ-
ations). Major General Patrick stressed that the United States government should
maintain a reserve corps of pilots and surplus parts, planes, mechanics, etc. to press
into service during an emergency. Id.
53. See H.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1925) (providing that
United States aircraft will function as a reserve air-fleet during times of war).
54. See Air Services Hearing, supra note 51, at 527 (concluding that the commer-
cial aviation industry can provide the military with aircraft as well as a pool of trained
pilots, mechanics, air-traffic controllers and other individuals who the government can
draft in war time).
55. H.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1925).
56. See id. (noting that since the United States auxiliary air force consists of com-
mercial aircraft registered in the United States, the individuals who own or control the
airline companies supplying the planes should be United States citizens to ensure the
aircraft's condition and availability).
57. See id. (stating that the Secretary of Commerce and representatives of the Sec-
retary of War and Secretary of the Navy proposed that United States citizens should
hold a minimum of seventy-five percent interest in a corporation applying for a United
States air-carrier certificate).
58. See id. (ensuring exclusion of foreign controlled aircraft from the United States
auxiliary air-fleet).
59. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568 (1926)
(previously 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-84 (West 1951) (repealed 1958)).
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qualified as a United States citizen.63 Consequently, the 1926 Act em-
bodies the least restrictive64 alternative for fulfilling congress' stated
national security goals. With the advent of the Great Depression and
New Deal Legislation, however, the justification for the citizenship re-
quirement changed from strict national security goals to protecting de-
veloping industries from foreign competition. 5
B. NEW DEAL LEGISLATION
One of the most serious ramifications of the Great Depression of the
1930's was the devastating transformation of international trade pol-
icy.66 Policy-makers shifted their economic position from advocating
the classical theory of free trade67 to heavy reliance on governmental
intervention through tariffs68 and quotas69 to stimulate domestic
growth.7 0 Adhering to this changing domestic philosophy, government
policy makers recommended government control over United States
airline development in both domestic and foreign commerce to advance
United States political and economic interests.71
63. Id. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 defines a citizen of the United States for
purposes of ownership and control of a domestic airline as:
(1) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or its possessions, or (2) a
partnership of which each member is an individual who is a citizen of the United
States or its possessions, or (3) a corporation or association created or organized
in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State,
Territory, or possession thereof, of which the president and two-thirds or more of
the board of directors or other managing officers thereof, as the case may be, are
individuals who are citizens of the United States or its possessions and in which
at least 51 per centum of the voting interest is controlled by persons who are
citizens of the united States or its possessions.
Id.
64. Id. Congress adopted a fifty-one percent ownership requirement rather than the
proposed seventy-five percent, and a two-thirds United States citizen requirement for
members of the board of directors rather than the proposed three-fourths. Id.
65. See infra notes 66-92 and accompanying text (describing Congress' new ration-
ale for a United States citizenship requirement for air-carriers).
66. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 11-12 (noting efforts to
avoid the popular "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy of international trade relations during
the 1930's).
67. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (describing what economists
term the classical liberal or free trade model of economic thought).
68. See PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 17, at 17
(defining tariff as a tax assessed on imports upon importation, frequently resulting in
increased consumer prices).
69. See id. (defining quota as a ceiling on the volume or value of a foreign import
admitted during a specified term).
70. REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 32, at 146.
71. See infra notes 78-98 (observing that nationalism and protectionism in the de-
velopment of air commerce prevents international free trade in the airline industry).
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Following the lead of the Federal Aviation Commission, the House
introduced H.R. 523472 which combined with other proposals to be-
come the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193871 (1938 Act). The 1938 Act
contained substantially the same definition of "citizen of the United
States" 4 as the 1926 Act7 5 with one important difference. The 1938
Act required seventy-five percent United States citizen ownership of
the voting interest in an airline for that airline to qualify as a United
States citizen while the 1926 Act required only fifty-one percent
United States citizen voting interest.7" In hearings prior to the imple-
mentation of the 1938 Act regarding increased United States govern-
mental intervention in the airline industry, proponents of a protectionist
policy argued that development of the industry necessitated making
airlines "a part of the commercial arm of the nation" 77 because of the
expense of commercial aviation. In addition, these proponents argued
that the United States government should assist United States air-car-
riers that operate in foreign commerce as much as possible.
78
In accordance with these concerns, the Department of Commerce de-
clared it inappropriate for a corporation with the minimum fifty-one
percent United States citizen ownership to receive economic support
from the United States government. 9 The Senate concurred with this
72. 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
73. Pub. L. No. 76-706, 52 Stat. 977 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301 et. seq.,
(1988)).
74. Id. § 179(a).
75. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568 (1926)
(previously 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-84 (West 1951) (repealed 1958)).
76. Id. § 6, 44 Stat. at 572.
77. Aviation: Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1937) (statement of Edgar G.
Gorrell, Air Transport Association of America).
78. Id. at 73 (asserting that only American air-carriers should receive economic
support for purposes of national commerce and national defense, particularly in compe-
tition with foreign air-carriers in foreign commerce).
79. Id. at 261 (statement of Dennis Mulligan, Office of the Solicitor, Department
of Commerce); see Hearings on S.2 and S. 1760 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 101 (1937) [hereinafter Interstate Com-
merce Hearings] (statement of Dennis Mulligan, Office of the Solicitor, Department of
Commerce). Mr. Mulligan stated:
Paragraph (d) of section 303 requires only a holding of 51 percent of the vot-
ing interest for air-carrier operations. While such a percentage is required under
the provisions of the Air Commerce Act for the purpose of determining the na-
tionality of owners of aircraft, it is at least open to question whether such a
percentage should suffice for air-carrier operations receiving economic protection
from a Federal Agency.
It is believed that serious consideration should be given to the air-carrier pre-
cedent of requiring at least a 75 percent ownership on the part of our nationals
before engaging in certain kinds of commercial enterprise. The differentiations
between stock ownership and stock control have been so clearly pointed out by
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philosophy and suggested that Congress increase the required percent-
age of American ownership and control of corporate stock8" before
granting an airline United States citizen status.81 Finally, in a state-
ment to the House Interstate Commerce Committee,82 the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce urged the Committee to study every aspect of
possible foreign control8" and suggested that the Civil Aeronautics Act
adopt the Shipping Act84 precedent of seventy-five percent United
States citizen ownership.85
In the mid-1930's, policy makers expressed the sentiment that Amer-
ican prestige and economic welfare required Americans to retain con-
trol of domestic airlines.86 In an attempt to further protect the aviation
industry from foreign incursion, Congress increased the mandatory per-
centage of United States citizen voting equity in a United States air-
carrier from fifty-one to seventy-five percent. 87 Congress based this ac-
tion on a carefully constructed theory, which hypothesized that al-
lowing a foreign citizen to hold forty-nine percent of the voting interest
in a corporation might, in fact, give control of operations to that for-
the Securities and Exchange Commission and leading writers on corporation fi-
nance that this matter should be given careful thought .... Fifty-one percent of
stock ownership is a rather nebulous term at best, and, as a matter of historical
record, even with respect to the present rule in the original Air Commerce Act
there was provided something quite different from what was actually approved in
the law.
Id.
80. Id. at 423 (statement of Senator Pat McCarran).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 79, 101, 423; Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 252, 254-55, 261-62, 267
(1937) [hereinafter Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing].
83. Interstate Commerce Hearings, supra note 79, at 101.
84. Shipping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-2460, § 2, 39 Stat. 728, 729 (codified at
46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1988)). The current version of the Shipping Act requires seventy-
five percent United States citizen ownership for registration of ships engaged in
coastwide trade and fifty-one percent United States citizen ownership for registration
of ships engaged in international trade. 46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1988).
85. Id. See Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing, supra note 82, at 252, 254-
55, 261 (concluding that Congress should emulate the water-carrier precedent and re-
quire United States air-carriers to restrict foreign holdings of voting equity to a maxi-
mum of twenty-five percent).
86. See Rivers and Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1447, 1470 (1979) (explaining that in cases in which governments promote
domestic growth through development of social and economic programs, government
decision-makers are unlikely to be affected by the impact of such programs on interna-
tional trade).
87. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, Pub. L. No. 76-706, 52 Stat. 977, 978
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) (1988)).
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eign citizen.8 During its deliberations, Congress completely disre-
garded the original intent of the citizenship requirement.8 9 Congress
abandoned the original intent in an effort to ensure the airline indus-
try's economic growth and security1 0 Consequently, Congress defined
"citizen of the United States" more strictly because of a policy to give
economic support to United States air-carriers in competition with for-
eign air-carriers,9 1 while it ostensibly limited foreign ownership for the
purpose of national defense. 2
By limiting the amount of voting equity a non-United States citizen
can hold in a United States air-carrier, the 1938 Act, in reality, im-
posed a quota on the amount of capital a foreign entity can invest in a
United States air-carrier. This situation thus presents a classic example
of the "infant industry argument" for protection of developing domestic
industries.93 In applying this policy, the government invokes either quo-
tas or tariffs in order to protect the development of a new industry
while that industry learns to function efficiently.' The assumption be-
hind the infant industry argument, as it relates to the aviation industry,
is that the initial start-up cost, coupled with the fierce competition from
subsidized foreign entities,95 prohibits United States firms from devel-
oping and competing in the industry.96 Consequently, in order to pre-
serve the industry seeking protection, the government imposes a tempo-
rary import restriction to ensure short-run profitability while the
industry develops.9 7 The inherent problem in infant industry protection,
88. See Interstate Commerce Hearings, supra note 79, at 101 (1937) (questioning
whether fifty-one percent stock ownership actually provides the holder with control of
the corporation).
89. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (noting Congress' intent to use
commercial transportation vehicles as an auxiliary military force in wartime).
90. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (explaining Congress' justifica-
tion for its abandonment of the original intent of the citizenship requirement during the
Great Depression).
91. Interstate Commerce Hearings, supra note 79, at 439-40, 504 (statement of
Edgar S. Gorrell, President, Air Transport Association of America).
92. Hearings on H.R. 9738, Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 147, 339 (1938) (statements of Clinton M. Hester, Assis-
tant General Counsel, Treasury Department and Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, President of
the Air Transport Association of America).
93. See R. Stern, Tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control: A Survey of Re-
cent Developments, 11 J. ECON. LITERATURE 857 (1973) (explaining that the infant
industry theory calls for temporary protection of certain industries during the early
stage of their development).
94. Id.
95. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing, supra note 82, at 72 (statement of
Edgar S. Gorrell, President, Air Transport Association of America).
96. Id.
97. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 16.
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however, as demonstrated by the airline industry's recent problems, is
that the industry being protected never matures because the quotas cre-
ate vested interests within the industry which help ensure that Congress
never repeals the beneficial protectionist legislation. As a result, ineffi-
cient domestic industries continue to survive and operate, benefiting
United States capitalists with the resources to invest in the protected




While Congress determines the course of United States trade pol-
icy,99 it has neither the resources nor the desire to respond to the vola-
tile nature of international commerce.100 The complex interrelation-
ships between the domestic pressures for trade barriers and the overall
desire for free international trade, as well as the lack of interest among
local constituents, make it hazardous for elected officials to involve
themselves in the intricacies of trade negotiations. 10 1 Consequently, the
executive branch, through a variety of specialized agencies, executes
United States international economic policy on a daily basis.'02 The
problem with current citizenship and control determinations, however,
is that they are made in an economic vacuum, without consideration of
the overall impact on long-term productivity and competitiveness in the
United States.
The deregulation of the airline industry in 1978103 constituted the
United States government's first attempt to encourage more competi-
tion among airlines. The stated objectives of the Deregulation Act were
"the avoidance of unreasonable industry concentration, excessive mar-
ket domination, and monopoly power" and "the encouragement of en-
try into air transportation markets by new carriers. '"104 In passing the
Deregulation Act Congress intended to force airlines to compete with
one another for consumers as well as for capital investments.105 Con-
98. Id. at 18.
99. See supra note 46 (explaining how Congress derives its power over foreign
trade policy).
100. S. COHEN, THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POL-
ICY: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 105-06 (1977).
101. Id. at 58.
102. Id. at 60.
103. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1522 (1988)) (Deregulation Act).
104. Id. at § 102(7), (10), 92 Stat. 1705, 1706-07.
105. S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978).
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gress concluded that, by relaxing investment criteria, established air-
lines could acquire additional financing while new companies could ac-
quire start-up capital and eventually compete with the industry
giants.106 Agency interpretations of the statute, however, remained
unaffected.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) currently interprets FAA
requirements. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the predecessor to
the DOT, initially determined that all foreign control evaluations
should focus on whether the foreign interests have the power, either
directly or indirectly, to influence the directors,107 officers 0 8 or stock-
holders1 0 9 of the applicant air carrier. 10 In applying these stringent
guidelines, the DOT essentially recognized two distinct types of foreign
control: control through personal relationships and financial control
through equity and debt ownership.
As a result of this restrictive interpretation of the congressional man-
date that foreign citizens may not hold more than twenty-five percent
of the voting stock of a United States air-carrier, the DOT examines
every aspect of interlocking corporate relationships to determine
whether a foreign entity has the power to exercise influence over a
United States air-carrier.1 Therefore, when one or more corporations
own or control an interest in an air-carrier which attempts to establish
citizenship, the DOT requires each and every corporate stockholder
within the corporate chain to establish that it is a citizen of the United
States within the meaning of the Act.11 2 Consequently, the DOT inter-
106. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3737, 3753.
107. In re Page Avjet Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5 at 2-3 (1983).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. See Uraba, Medellin, Cent. Airways-Canal Zone-Columbia Op., 2 CA.B.
334, 337 (1940) (establishing basic citizenship criteria by holding that Congress in-
tended that the CAB investigate whether the applicant is a citizen of the United States
in fact, in purpose, and in management rather than merely applying a strict mathemat-
ical formula to calculate voting equity percentages).
111. See Cathay Pacific Airways Case, C.A.B. Order No. 77-3-91 at 2 (1977) (dis-
cussing interrelationships between companies and the question of control). But see
BARRON's DIcIoNARY OF FINANCE AND INVESM ENT TERMS, (J. Downes & J. Good-
man eds. 1985) (stating that an entity controls a corporation if that entity can cause
the corporation to do its bidding).
112. See Cathay Pacific, C.A.B. Order No. 77-3-91 at 2 (defining affiliate in terms
of the relationship between companies).
[W]e shall define 'affiliate' to mean a person who directly or indirectly through
a representative, nominee, trustee, subsidiary, attorney, or other agent owns, con-
trols, or holds the power to vote 10 percent or more of the debt obligations [in-
cluding voting securities or total securities] of another person. The term includes
both parents and subsidiaries and affiliates of parents and subsidiaries.
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pretation effectively makes the citizenship of the applicant corporation
dependent upon the citizenship of each and every shareholder and cor-
poration in a corporate chain as well as the citizenship of affiliated per-
sons and corporations.
A. CONTROL THROUGH PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Applicants often orchestrate their organizational configuration
merely to meet the minimum foreign control requirements. The issue
before the DOT in these instances is who actually controls the air-car-
rier."3 The DOT approaches this issue by determining whether the or-
ganizational configuration allows a foreign interest to exercise a degree
of control sufficient to nullify the United States controlling interests," 4
or to restrict the United States carrier's operations to suit the needs of
the particular foreign interest."
5
In one of the earliest decisions regarding the possibility of a foreign
interest exercising control through personal relationships," 6 the CAB
concluded that Interamerican Air Freight Company failed to meet the
citizenship standards set forth in the 1958 Act"" because several of the
applicant's officers and employees enjoyed long-standing personal and
professional relationships with Daetwyler, a Swiss national." 8 The
CAB determined that Daetwyler could influence decisions of the appli-
Id. (citing Pre-hearing Conference Report dated August 5, 1975, in Application of
Tourist Enterprises Corp., at 30-31 Docket 27914).
113. See Willye Peter Daetwyler, D.B.A. Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign
Permit, 58 C.A.B. 118, 119 (1971) (questioning whether a non-United States citizen
can exercise control over the United States citizen owners).
114. See id. (noting that the CAB looks beyond intricate corporate structures and
United States "citizen front men" to ascertain whose financial interests are at stake
and who will actually run the corporation).
115. See Application of Premiere Airlines, Inc., 95 C.A.B. 101, 103-05 (1982)
(concluding highly favorable loans from foreign citizens gave those foreign citizens sub-
stantial influence over the airline by allowing the foreign citizens the ability to exercise
control over the United States citizen borrower).
116. Willye Peter Daetwyler, D.B.A. Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Per-
mit, 58 C.A.B. 118 (1971).
117. Id. at 120-22.
118. Id. Daetwyler formed a United States company to take over its international
airfreight operations, which Daetwyler previously operated as a foreign air-carrier. Id.
at 127. Daetwyler, a non-United States citizen, owned twenty-five percent of the com-
pany's voting stock and represented one-third of the board of directors. Id. at 129. The
remaining shareholders, directors, and officers were all United States citizens, but they
were also employees of other Daetwyler companies. Id. at 128-29. The CAB concluded
that Daetwyler would be able to influence decisions by the officers and directors to such
an extent as to constitute control. Id. at 131-33. The Board based its conclusion on
three findings: that Daetwyler controlled the other corporations in which the stockhold-
ers, officers, and directors of the applicant air-carrier were employees; that a relation-
ship existed among Daetwyler and the applicant's United States stockholders, officers,
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cant's board of directors and officers to an extent that violated the
CAB's interpretation of the foreign control limitation.11 In conclusion,
the CAB held that the definition of United States citizen does not in-
clude corporations barely meeting the minimum voting interest require-
ment if foreign citizens in fact control the air-carrier. 120 By employing
a personal relationship evaluation, the DOT unnecessarily restricts the
number of qualified individuals who can make significant investments
in an air-carrier under the guise that any United States carrier might
be susceptible to control by foreign interests, 21 regardless of whether
the foreign entity's interest remains below the congressionally man-
dated twenty-five percent voting equity or whether that foreign entity
affirmatively exercises control.1 22
and directors; and that the applicant would continue to do business as part of the sys-
tem of Daetwyler-controlled companies. Id.
Compare Bernardine Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1975)
(establishing factors considered in determining whether a parent corporation actually
controls a subsidiary). The factors established in Bernardine include 1) the amount of
the subsidiary's capital stock owned by the parent, 2) the number of common directors,
3) financing of the subsidiary by the parent, 4) whether the parent caused the subsidi-
ary's incorporation, 5) whether the subsidiary has adequate capital, 6) who pays the
subsidiary employees' salaries, 7) who pays other miscellaneous expenses of the subsidi-
ary and who pays the losses, 8) whether the parent corporation exercises control over
the property of the subsidiary, and 9) independence of the directors and executives of
the subsidiary. Id. But see United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691
(5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a person who is either an officer or director of both a
parent corporation and its subsidiary can represent the interests of both separately and
independently).
119. Willye Peter Daetwyler, D.B.A. Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Per-
mit, 58 C.A.B. at 120.
120. Id.
121. See The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T.
Order No. 89-9-51 at 6 (1989) (reasoning that heightened equity interest, and the
ability to exert influence and status, as both an actual and potential competitor, are
important elements tending to support the conclusion that the foreign investor's rela-
tionship with Northwest puts the air-carrier in a position violative of the control limita-
tions); Application of Pan Aviation, D.O.T. Order No. 85-3-85 at 3 (1985) (suggesting
that questions surrounding forgiveness of an investor's debt obligations and the likeli-
hood of foreign control have a direct bearing on an investor's fitness).
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 1378(f) (1988) (defining control as ownership of ten percent
or more of the carrier's capital or voting stock). The provision provides:
[A]ny person owning beneficially 10 per centum or more of the voting securi-
ties or capital, as the case may be, of an air carrier shall be presumed to be in
control of such air carrier unless the Board finds otherwise. As used herein, bene-
ficial ownership of 10 per centum of the voting securities of a carrier means
ownership of such amount of its outstanding voting securities as entitles the
holder thereof to cast 10 per centum of the aggregate votes which the holders of
all the outstanding voting securities of such carrier are entitled to cast.
Id.
Compare The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T.
Order No. 89-9-51 at 5 (1989) (concluding that guidelines used for determining citi-
zenship consistently distinguish between de facto control and mere investment). The
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B. CONTROL THROUGH CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
In a case decided shortly after the passing of the 1978 Act,123 the
CAB further limited the ability of United States air-carriers to obtain
capital infusions by holding that satisfaction of the technical criteria
mandating that United States citizens hold seventy-five percent of an
airlines voting equity is merely a threshold issue for purposes of iden-
tity of control.' 24 The CAB concluded that the real question with re-
spect to citizenship is whether the applicant does or can assert control
in any way. 12 5 In response to this extraordinarily restrictive interpreta-
tion of FAA section 1301(16) and growing concerns over the future of
the airline industry, the CAB approved a capital transfer of securities
options, the exercise of which would result in a foreign corporation
owning twenty-five percent of the voting stock of a United States air-
line. 1 26 The approved transaction, however, gave the foreign corpora-
tion the right to elect a proportional number of directors to the air-
carrier's board, 2" even though the foreign corporation was already the
carriers' principle creditor.'28 In so doing, the CAB temporarily aban-
doned its restrictive citizenship interpretation,' 29 and momentarily ac-
knowledged that Congress intended the citizenship requirement to limit
DOT's principal concern is to examine cases in which foreign air-carriers are motivated
by a direct, vested interest in controlling the marketing of the United States carriers'
service, as opposed to disinterested investors whose only purpose is to maximize their
return. Id.
123. Application of Silvas Air Lines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 80-10-103 (1980).
124. See id. at 3-4 (concluding that a foreign investor's principle control came
through his loan arrangement with Silvas because the proceeds of the loan were depo-
sited into a special bank account and withdrawals could only be made with the foreign
investor's explicit approval). The CAB subsequently held that since the foreign investor
had complete control over the carrier's use of the loan proceeds, he had control over the
airline itself, even though he only owned twenty-five percent of the voting stock. Id.
125. See id. at 3 (concluding that Congress did not intend to liberalize citizenship
requirements when it enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978).
126. See In re Citizenship of Golden West Airlines, Co., C.A.B. Order No. 82-7-23
at 2 (1982) (finding that Golden West would continue to meet the United States citi-
zenship requirement, even though a Canadian corporation owned twenty-five percent of
Golden West's voting stock, could elect a member of the Board of Directors, and held
more than one-half of Golden West's long-term debt).
127. See id. (finding that the ability of a foreign entity to elect a member to the
board of directors did not harm the citizenship of the airline).
128. See id. (finding that the citizenship requirements of the Federal Aviation Act
were met despite the fact that a foreign entity held more than half of Golden West's
long-term debt); accord Application of Charlotte Aircraft Corp., Intercontinental Air-
ways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 81-9-64 at 6 (1981) (holding that a carrier was a United
States citizen even though a Netherlands corporation acquired twenty percent of the
United States carrier's common stock and was the carrier's principle creditor).
129. See Institutional Control of Air-Carriers Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 82-
9-84 at 4 (1984) (formulating a policy that allowed a foreign interest to acquire a large
block of a carrier's debt without undermining the carrier's citizenship status).
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control in voting equity rather than control of non-voting equity or debt
investments. 130 In the following years, the CAB subtly revised the citi-
zenship standard to allow innovative investment structures, 31 and to
create a less stringent standard of foreign control analysis, 13 2 while it
permitted the influx of greater amounts of foreign capital.1 33
In 1987, however, the citizenship standard returned to its previously
restrictive form.134 The DOT maintained that the precedent established
in In re Page Avjet Corp."3 5 reflected the outer limits of permissible
foreign control under the Act. 36 The DOT subsequently found Intera
Arctic services, Inc. susceptible to foreign control137 because foreign in-
vestors could use the threat of forcing the carrier to repurchase stock to
influence the carrier's activities.13 ' This holding, coupled with more re-
130. See id. (recognizing that air-carriers must compete with other industries for
financing and even though creditors possess some incidental means of control through
their position as creditors, increasing the regulatory burden places them at a disadvan-
tage when competing with unregulated industries).
131. See Application of Premiere Airlines, Inc., 95 C.A.B. 101, 101-02 (1982)
(granting Premiere's certificate once it restructured its stock plan to remove all foreign
influence over the voting interests through the establishment of a voting trust).
132. Id.
133. Application of Premiere Airlines, Inc., Fitness Investigation, C.A.B. Order
No. 82-5-11 (1982). In Premiere, a foreign citizen provided a significant portion of the
applicant carrier's intended start-up capital in what was purported to be a "no strings"
attached gift to a United States citizen. Id. at 2. The terms of the loan agreement were
highly favorable to the borrower. Id. The principle concern in Premiere was not that a
foreign citizen owned twenty-five percent of the voting stock, Id. at 2-3; rather, the
CAB focused on the fact that Premiere's principle United States citizen shareholder,
Cicippio, financed his purchase of shares through a loan from a Saudi Arabian citizen.
Id. Thus, the CAB's concern was that the Saudi Arabian creditor may be able to influ-
ence Cicippio. Id. The CAB resolved the problem of possible foreign control by requir-
ing the United States citizen with ties to the Saudi Arabian citizen to place his stock in
a voting trust which would be voted in proportion to the remaining shares. Id. at 3-4.
See also In re Page Avjet Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5 at 1 (1983) (noting how a
foreign investor acquired one-hundred percent of the non-voting shares of an airline).
In Page, the holder of the non-voting shares had the power to initiate and approve a
company liquidation on dissolution, and to vote and approve company actions in ex-
traordinary circumstances, such as a merger or consolidation. Id. Initially, the CAB
ruled that because the non-voting share could block a merger, dissolution, or liquida-
tion, the foreign non-voting shareholder controlled the company. Id. at 3. The CAB
resolved the issue when Page Avjet Corporation established a buy-out provision where
the voting shareholders could buy back the non-voting shares if they blocked corporate
action. In re Page Avjet Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 84-8-12 at 1 (1984).
134. In re Intera Arctic Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43 (1987) (holding
that a corporation must, as a factual matter, be controlled by a United States citizen in
order to meet the citizenship requirements of the 1978 Act).
135. C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5 (1983). See also supra note 133 and accompanying
text (discussing the rationale and pertinent facts of the Page decision).
136. In re Intera Arctic Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43 at 11 (1987).
137. Id. at 14.
138. See id. at 11-14 (distinguishing this case from Page Avjet, in which a buy-out
option was far less onerous). The Department also held two of the carrier's key person-
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
cent DOT decisions,13 returned the citizenship requirement to its prim-
itive roots of stringent regulation.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
On January 23, 1991, the DOT issued Order 91-1-4,14 which sig-
nificantly liberalized the DOT's stringent foreign investment policy by
allowing Wings Holdings to increase its interest in Northwest Airlines
to forty-nine percent equity ownership.' 4 1 The only limitations placed
on the amount of equity Wings could hold were that the total equity
held by foreign citizens could not exceed forty-nine percent 14 2 and for-
eign held voting equity could not exceed the twenty-five percent statu-
tory limitation. 143 This decision effectively rejects the longstanding
CAB and DOT policy that any indication of potential control by non-
United States citizens mandates a finding of foreign ownership. 44
Now that the DOT has finally acknowledged the difference between
voting equity, non-voting equity and debt equity, as well as the inherent
problems of restricting capital investment, Congress should follow suit
and clarify its intentions for restricting foreign investment. Congress
should go even further than the DOT and allow foreign concerns to
hold up to forty-nine percent voting equity and one hundred percent
non-voting equity in a United States air-carrier. 45 Requiring United
nel were employees of the foreign investors, and would be "ready conduits" for Intera
to use in attempting to exercise control. Id. at 12.
139. See Joint Application of Blue Bell, Inc., Wrangler Aviation, Inc. and W.A.
Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 88-2-43 at 1-3 (1988) (Blue Bell I) (concluding that
in instances where persons with longstanding financial and business ties to a foreign
citizen attempt to sever those ties, the DOT looks beyond mere formalistic relationships
and considers the prior business relationships of a United States carrier's principle of-
ficers with a foreign citizen corporation). In Blue Bell, the DOT refused to approve the
transfer because of the possibility that the transaction might subject the carrier to for-
eign control. Id. at 3.
140. In re The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc.,
D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41 (1991).
141. Id. at 20. The DOT concluded that forty-nine percent foreign equity owner-
ship remained within the permissible statutory limit, "based on our reassessment of the
complexities of today's corporate and financial environment [and] a reexamination of
the relationship between nonvoting equity/debt and control in light of our recent expe-
rience . . . ." Id. at 16.
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 17 (rationalizing the conflict with previous decisions by noting that
United States citizens hold approximately two-thirds of the non-voting equity in Wings
and also hold the power to appoint the majority of the Wings directors). In dicta, the
DOT also noted that debt would no longer be considered for purposes of ascertaining
potential or actual foreign control. Id. at 20.
145. It is important to remember that the DOT is prohibited from exceeding the
authority Congress granted to it to correct flaws in the congressional scheme. Ulti-
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States citizens to own seventy-five percent of an air-carrier's voting in-
terest is, in reality, a statutory outcropping of neomercantilist philoso-
phy, which asserts an infant industry argument as a guise for protec-
tionist actions. This policy completely ignores the theory that trade
liberalization and expansion increases competition within the domestic
market and forces lethargic companies to terminate inefficient activities
and to revamp management strategies.
One of the markets in which the corporation functions is the market
for capital. In the 1980's, capital markets influenced corporate manage-
ment through the fear of hostile takeovers. Management became more
aware of the market's appraisal of their performance as reflected in the
price of its corporation's shares. One of the major advantages of the
corporation is the ease with which it can draw upon the resources of
many individuals. Ideally, the capital market should serve to judge the
performance of firms and to decide whether or not their past achieve-
ments and future prospects warrant channeling more resources into a
given field.
The airline industry needs an infusion of capital to expand. By re-
ducing restrictions on foreign investment, United States airlines could
attract more capital from foreign investors and foreign carriers eager to
expand into the United States market. If Congress is unwilling to re-
write the citizenship requirement, the DOT should comply with the
spirit of the 1978 Deregulation Act and liberalize the citizenship inter-
pretation in such a way as to adhere to congressional intent while ac-
knowledging economic realities.
A seemingly obvious solution would be to permit non-United States
citizen-owners, who merely wish to passively invest in an airline and
have no interest in exercising control, to place their interest in a voting
trust. Recently, the DOT stated its approval of such a solution.140 This
solution, however, is contrary to previous agency holdings in which the
DOT concluded that voting trusts merely symbolize a temporary re-
medy until the airline locates a United States citizen investor.4 7 The
mately, an administrative agency is powerless to correct perceived flaws in the statute it
is empowered to administer. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361, 374 (1990). The agency's rulemaking power is limited to adopting regulations to
carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed in the statute. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Consequently, if the Act fails to achieve the in-
tended results, Congress, not the DOT, must change the statutory language.
146. See Application of Discovery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41 at 14
(1989) (stating that voting trusts are an effective means for a company to remain func-
tional while it reorganizes its capital structure to meet the citizenship criteria).
147. See Toolco-Northeast Control Case, 42 C.A.B. 822, 825 (1965) (concluding
that a control relationship does not terminate merely because stock is placed in a voting
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trustee solution, while seemingly ingenious, also presents the inherent
problem that the trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of the beneficiary. Therefore, the voting trust fails to ade-
quately solve the control problem.
A more viable approach to the lack of available capital entails a two-
step strategy. First, the DOT should adhere to the Northwest Airlines
rationale and continue to acknowledge the distinction between different
types of capital investments. Economists generally divide capital invest-
ments into two categories: debt148 and equity investments.149 Equity se-
curity represents equity participation and, therefore, an ownership in-
terest. 15° The term is used in contradistinction to a "debt security" and
represents a shareholder's, rather than a creditor's, interest.1 51 Thus,
the DOT should, at the very least, allow unlimited debt investments
while continuing to liberalize the equity restrictions.
Second, as a solution to the problem of personal relationships, as well
as debt versus equity investments, the DOT should follow the rationale
used in Joint Application of Blue Bell, Inc, Wrangler Aviation, Inc.
and W.A. Services, Inc."5 2 In Blue Bell HI, a foreign investor appointed
trust). In Toolco, the non-United States citizen attempted to alleviate a control prob-
lem by placing stock in a voting trust. Id. at 823.
But see Regent Air Fitness Investigation, 102 C.A.B. 260, 282-83 (1979) (setting
forth two circumstances in which a voting trust could be used to alleviate control
problems:
[W]e have held repeatedly that, with few exceptions, voting trusts could not
insulate the beneficial owner of stock from control. Where we have found voting
trusts sufficient to insulate the beneficial owner from control, we have generally
relied upon the existence of the following factors.
1)Proportional voting of the shares in trust on all issues, which in effect made the
vote of the other shareholders controlling; and
2)hostility between the carriers management and those whose shares are being
put in trust.
Id.
But compare Seaboard and Western Airlines, Agreements, 32 C.A.B. 1322, 1325
(1960) (delineating certain factors which could insulate a voting trust from the control
of a non-United States citizen investor).
148. See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (J. Downes
& J. Goodman eds. 1985) (defining debt security as an obligation to receive a corpo-
rate security indicated as debt on the corporation's books). These debt investments usu-
ally take the form of corporate or government bonds. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365
(5th ed. 1979).
149. See Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (1988) (defining equity security as
a share in a corporation, a limited partner's interest in a limited partnership, or a right
to control an interest in the company).
150. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (5th ed. 1979) (stating that equity secur-
ity is any non-debt type of security, such as stock).
151. Id.
152. See D.O.T. Order No. 88-4-68 (1988) (Blue Bell I) at 15-16 (concluding that
an agreement which provides that a foreigner with extensive ties to key management
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its former employees as the applicant carrier's key personnel with the
DOT's approval.153 Rather than concluding that a foreign interest con-
trolled Blue Bell, the DOT noted that a carrier may still qualify as a
United States citizen even though a foreign investor's former employees
controlled over forty-nine percent of the voting stock.'" Applying this
rationale, the DOT should continue to acknowledge the fact that a car-
rier may take effective steps to prevent a foreign investor from control-
ling a company even where the foreign investor's employees have a sub-
stantial interest in the company and the foreign investor himself holds
a substantial debt interest in the airline along with the maximum eq-
uity interest. If the DOT wants to implement the statute in a way con-
sistent with congressional intent and economic realities, the innovative
agreement Blue Bell II should represent the rule rather than the excep-
tion in cases where there is a question as to whether a foreign entity
can exert control over voting-interest holders because of previous per-
sonal and professional relationships.
CONCLUSION
Initially, Congress implemented capital restrictions in the airline in-
dustry to reflect its concerns that national security interests necessi-
tated limiting foreign ownership and control of United States air-carri-
ers. As this concern subsided, United States economic troubles became
the rallying point for the need to restrict foreign investment. Changing
multinational economic relationships have made these initial justifica-
tions for a citizenship requirement counter-productive. If, as the free
trade theory suggests, a nation's prosperity is based on its economic
personnel will not exert any influence over management allowed Wrangler to qualify as
a United States citizen).
153. Id. In Blue Bell II, Profit Freight Systems, Inc. acquired twenty-four percent
of the carrier's voting stock and was its principle creditor. Id. (referencing the factual
allegations set forth in the first Blue Bell decision, Joint Application of Blue Bell, Inc.,
Wrangler Aviation, Inc., and W.A Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 88-2-43 (1988)).
More importantly, Profit's former employees owned forty-nine percent of the carrier's
voting stock, held three of six directorships, and were the carrier's principal officers. Id.
154. Joint Application of Blue Bell, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 88-4-68 (1988). Com-
pare Hawaiian Airlines - Japan Air Lines Control Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order
No. 88-12-42 (1988) (allowing Japan Air, a foreign investor competing directly with
Hawaiian Airlines, to purchase 20 percent of Hawaiian Airlines' voting stock). In Ha-
waiian Airlines, the Department concluded that the transaction did not violate the citi-
zenship test because of a non-interference agreement with Hawaiian's management
that restricted the exercise of direct or indirect control over the company. Id. at 3. See
also Transpacific Enterprises, Inc. and America West Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No.
87-8-31 (1987) (allowing a foreign investor to purchase twenty percent of America
West because America West adopted several restrictions on foreign ownership to limit
foreign influence and control of the company).
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productivity, then the government should create an environment in
which the pressures and challenges from competition force the airline
industry to develop innovative approaches to profitability which benefit
both the consumer and the producer.
Relaxation of the citizenship requirements is necessary to ensure the
continuation of a competitive airline industry. High oil prices, heavy
debt, and decreased consumer demand all magnify the problems inher-
ent in an industry crippled by its inability to acquire sufficient capital
investment because of an illogically uncompromising restriction on for-
eign capital investment. 55
155. See Application of Discovery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 90-7-17 (1990)
(praising the citizenship requirement as essential to United States aviation policy and
refusing to relax the requirement even to allow needed foreign investment in the avia-
tion industry).
In Discovery, the DOT reasserted its stringent position, stating:
[The DOT is] committed to a policy of fostering new entry in the airline in-
dustry, and welcomes lawful foreign investment as a part of that process. We
cannot, however, allow such considerations of policy to undermine the basic re-
quirements of the law, which include the mandate to ensure carriers' fitness and
U.S. citizenship. These standards are among the most basic to the entire regula-
tory framework of the aviation industry. We therefore do not take lightly the
possibility . . . of foreign control of a U.S. airline.
Id. at 1.
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